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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
could have been raised.-° Despite a decree's inadequacy 20 or
its grant of relief without adequate foundation, 21 it is con-
clusive upon the parties if entered by consent. Thus, in the
instant case, even had the decree been defective for want of
an adjudication of infringement, it had been entered with
defendants' consent and therefore should have been binding.
PROCEDURE
PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE IN INDIANA
The Indiana Supreme Court in 1940 adopted in substance
the federal rule providing for pre-trial conference procedure.'
The 1940 rule was retained verbatim in the 1943 revision of
the Supreme Court Rules.2
19. Nashville, Chattanooga and St. Louis R.R."v. U.S., 113 U.S. 261(1885).
20. U.S. v. Radio Corp. of America, 46 F.Supp,. 654 (D.Del., 1942).
21. Cushman and Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Grammes, 234 Fed. 952
(E.D.Pa., 1916). Even if a decree is entered without support of
facts, it is not void, U.S. v. Swift and Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932);
consent cannot give juridiction, but it may bind the parties and
waive previous errors if, when the court acts, jurisdiction has
been obtained, Pacific Railroad v. Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289 (1879).
1. Fed. R. Civ. P., 16.
2. Rules of the Indiana Supreme Court, Rule 1-4:
"In any action except criminal cases, the court may in its discre-
tion and shall upon motion of any party, direct the attorneys for
the parties to appear before it for a conference to consider:
(a) The simplification and closing of the issues;
(b) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the plead-
ings;
(c) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of
documents which will avoid unnecessary proof or the
introduction of unnecessary evidence;
(d) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(e) Such other matters as may expedite the determination
of the action.
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken
at the conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and
the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters con-
sidered which limit the issues for trial to those not disposed of by
admissions or agreements of counsel; and such order when entered
shall control the subsequent course of the action, unless modified
thereafter to prevent manifest injustice. The court in its discre-
tion may establish by rule a pre-trial calendar on which actions
may be placed for consideration as above provided, and may either
confine the calendar to jury actions or non-jury actions or extend
it to all actions."
In comparing the Indiana and Federal Rules, it should be
noted that the following portions of the Indiana Rule are omitted
in' the Federal Rule: " ... and shall upon the motion of any
party . . . " (first paragraph), " . . . and closing of the issues;"
(clause (a)), " . . . or the introduction of unnecessary evidence;"
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The pre-trial conference is of recent origin in the United
States.3 "Its underlying philosophy is that litigants, their
attorneys, and the trial court should, in an informal manner,
approach each other and seek by fair and open methods the
grounds upon which they differ."'4  While first used in the
larger American cities to relieve the congested condition of
trial calendars,- another avowed purpose of the procedure
is to take the trials of cases out of the "realm of surprise
and maneuvering.",,
Under the Indiana rule the trial courts have power to
make pre-trial procedure mandatory7 in all civil actions
(clause (c)). The Indiana Rule, however, omits clause 5 of the
Federal Rule whhich provides for reference of the issues to a
master for findings to be used as evidence in the case of jury trials.
3. In the United States the procedure originated in 1932 in the Circuit
Court of Wayne County in Detroit, Michigan. In 1935 similar
procedure based on a study of the Detroit system was adopted
in the Superior Court for Suffolk County in the City of Boston.
The Common Pleas Court of Cleveland, Ohio adopted the proced-
ure in 1939. By 1941 the procedure was operating in the courts
of some 14 states. Simes, "A Survey of the Administration of
Justice in New England" (1943) 23 B.U.L.Rev. 28. Chicago is
the latest large city to adopt the procedure. Fisher, "Judicial
Mediation: How It Works Through Pre-Trial Conference" (1943)
10 U. Chli. L. Rev. 453. The history and theory of the procedure
are traced in Dobie, "Use of Pre-trial Practice in Rural Districts,"
1 F.R.D. 371 (1940), and Sunderland, "The Theory and Practice
of Pre-Trial Procedure" (1937) 36 Mich. L. Rev. 215.
4. Crawford, "Problems of the Pre-Trial Conference" (1946) 31 Corn.
L. Q. 285, 289; Brown v. Christman, 126 F(2d) 625 (App. D.C.
1942); LeConin v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford et al., 41 F.
Supp. 1021 (E.D. N.Y. 1941). Where in a personal injury suit
both parties introduced much photographic evidence to show the
extent to which a train protruded into a safety zone while rounding
a curve the court said: "Doubtless the show was highly entertain-
ing to the jury, but entertainment of the jury is no function of a
trial. And why all this fuss to prove a fact susceptible of easy,
exact and indisputable demonstration by actual measurement?
The court might well have required that the parties stipulate as
to the extent of the invasion of the zone by the turning train. Here
would have been an excellent opportunity for settling an indis-
putable fact in a pre-trial conference such as sec. 269. 65 Stats.
contemplates." Hadrian et al. v. Milwaukee Electric Ry. and
Transport Co., 241 Wis. 122, 1 N.W. (2d) 755 (1942).
5. Pre-trial procedure was adopted by the Wayne Co., Mich. Circuit
Court to alleviate a calendar delay of four years in law cases. At
the time of adoption by the Suffolk County Court of Boston the
trials of jury cases were approximately five years in arrears.
Simes, "A Survey of the Administration of Justice in New Eng-
land" (1943) 10 B. U. L. Rev. 28. See Fanciullo v. B.G.&S. The-
atre Corp., 297 Mass. 44, 8 N.E. (2d) 174 (1947) (passim).
6. Laws, "Pre-Trial Procedure," 1 F.R.D. 397 (1940).
7. While the rule itself provides no penalty for its violation, it has
been suggested, 1 Gavit, "Indiana Pleading and Practice" (1941)
19471 281.
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This order is binding on the parties16 and court unless modi-
fied at trial to prevent manifest injustice. 17
PROCEDURE
THE RULE-MAKING POWER
Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to enforce the
provisions of a statute' providing that when a trial judge
failed to determine an issue of law or fact within ninety
days after taking same under advisement, any party was
entitled to apply for withdrawal of the issue from the judge
and for appointment of a special judge to take jurisdiction
of the case. The trial judge refused petitioner's application.
Held: Writ denied. Statute is an unconstitutional legislative
interference with the judicial function.2 State ex rel Kostas
v. Johnson, 69 N.E.(2d) 592 (Ind. 1946).
In 1923, when the statutory provision involved in the
principal case was enacted, there was general acquiescence in
the power of the legislature to prescribe rules of practice
and procedure, 3 although a strong inclination to the contrary
had been indicated by the Indiana Supreme Court.4 However,
the legislative power was always subject to constitutional
limitations to prevent interference with action of the courts
16. Where it was stipulated by pre-trial order that a contract was
made in Florida but at the trial there was evidence from which
it could be inferred that the contract was made in Texas, the court
held that the stipulation was binding since the order was not
modified, Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc.
v. Olvera, 119 F. (2d) 584 (C.C.A. 9th, 1941). Accord, Gurman
v. Stowe-Woodward, Inc., 302 Mass. 442, 19 N.E.(2d) 717 (1939);
E. Dunkel, Inc. v. Barletta Co., 302 Mass. 7, 18 N.E.(2d) 377 (1937).
17. It has been held that in order to prevent manifest injustice the
trial judge in the exercise of his judicial discretion may: permit
amendments or corrections of mistakes in the pleadings, McDowall
v. Orr Felt & Blanket Co., 146 F.(2d) 136 (C.C.A. 6th, 1945);
discharge stipulations entered into under a misapprehension, Gur-
man v. Stowe-Woodward, Inc., 302 Mass. 442, 19 N.E.(2d) 717
1939); or improvidently made, Capano v. Melchinno, 297 Mass. 1,
7 N.E.(2d) 593 (1937).
1. Ind. Acts 1923, c. 83, § 1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl. 1946)
§2-2102.
2. Ind. Const. Art. 3, § 1 and Art. 7, § 1.
3. Smythe v. Boswell, 117 Ind. 365, 20 N.E. 263 (1888); Fletcher
v. Holmes, 25 Ind. 458 (1865).
4. Gray v. McLaughlin, 191 Ind. 190, 131 N.E. 518 (1921); Soli-
meto v. State, 188 Ind. 170, 122 N.E. 578 (1919); Parkison v.
Thompson, 164 Ind. 609, 73 N.E. 109 (1905).
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